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I. INTRODUCTION
The international standards that govern air safety are embod-
ied in the Convention on International Civil Aviation. Member-
ship in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is
based on the assumption that each contracting State adheres to
the international safety regulations established by the Organiza-
tion. However, not all ICAO member nations have fully imple-
mented the safety standards, and some of them are not
exercising the required safety oversight.
In 1992, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) estab-
lished the International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) Pro-
gram, under which the FAA assesses the practices of foreign
countries to determine whether they meet the international
standards established by ICAO. If the country investigated is
found to comply with ICAO safety standards, the country is de-
fined as Category I and its carriers are allowed to operate freely
to the United States. On the other hand, if the assessment
shows that the country does not provide adequate safety over-
sight of its carriers, the country is placed in Category II. Coun-
tries in Category II with carriers operating to the United States
at the time of the assessment are permitted to continue opera-
tions at current levels under heightened FAA surveillance.
Those countries in Category II without existing operations are
not allowed to commence service to the United States, unless
those operations are performed using aircraft wet-leased from a
Category I country.
In 1998, the ICAO created the Universal Safety Oversight Au-
dit Programme (USOAP), which calls for mandatory and regu-
lar safety oversight audits of all contracting States to determine
their level of compliance with the Chicago Convention and its
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Annexes. This Programme superseded the voluntary Safety
Oversight Assessment Programme, under which assessments
were only carried out at the petition of the member nations.'
ICAO's current Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme as-
sesses each contracting State's implementation of safety over-
sight and relevant ICAO Standards and Recommended
Practices, associated procedures, guidance material, and safety-
related practices. USOAP also provides for action plans to ad-
dress identified deficiencies and direct assistance, and when re-
quired, to carry out corrective measures.
The Central American Aviation Safety Agency was created on
December 15, 1999, as a dependency of the Central American
Air Navigation Services Corporation. The Agency was prompted
by the need of the Central American countries for a regional
entity in charge of matters related to safety navigation, and the
need to improve the region's safety oversight capabilities. Fur-
ther, this regional system relieves smaller States of the economic
burden of operating individual oversight agencies. The main
function of this regional entity is to provide safety oversight for
the Central American region. The Agency recommends and ad-
vises the member countries on the fulfillment of their obliga-
tions under the Chicago Convention and its Annexes, in
relation to air safety navigation.
II. BACKGROUND
The Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago
Convention), together with the Standards and Recommended
Practices contained in its Annexes, establish the international
standards that govern air safety. 2 These Standards and Recom-
mended Practices comprise all operational and technical aspects
of aviation and form the basis for the safe and orderly develop-
ment of international civil aviation. As of publication, one hun-
dred and eighty eight States have signed and become parties to
the Convention.'
I This member nation-initiated process is the main reason why the voluntary
Programme was not regarded as a very effective tool in improving a country's
safety oversight.
2 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention]. The Convention was signed at
Chicago on December 7, 1944, and entered into force on April 4, 1947. See infra
Annex I.
3 See infra Annex I (The Federation of Saint Kitts and Nevis is the most recent
signatory, ratifying the Convention on May 21, 2002).
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The Chicago Convention also created the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO), to assure international coopera-
tion and the highest possible degree of uniformity in regula-
tions, standards, and procedures in civil aviation matters.4 One
of the major focuses of the ICAO is to promote flight safety in
international air navigation. All contracting States to the Chi-
cago Convention are required to adopt measures to ensure
safety through conformity with international standards in their
safety oversight obligations.5 The States have also agreed to
comply with the Standards and Recommended Practices
presented by the ICAO in a series of Annexes.' Each ICAO An-
nex establishes the minimum standards required for interna-
tional operation of aircraft registered in the contracting States.
The Standards and Recommended Practices set forth in each
ICAO Annex, while not mandatory, provide information about
what standards should be adhered to in order to guarantee avia-
tion safety.
Every contracting State to the Chicago Convention must rec-
ognize the validity of the aircraft certificates and licenses issued
by the contracting State, as long as they are issued in accordance
with the minimum standards established in the Convention.7
All the contracting States rely on those foreign certificates as evi-
dence that the carriers from the other contracting States can
operate safely in the other States' territory.
The Convention does not provide for a safety compliance and
enforcement authority, and its effectiveness in guaranteeing avi-
ation safety is based upon the assumption that each contracting
State adheres to the organization's safety standards, which re-
present the minimum standard each member country and car-
rier must meet.
III. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
A. THE INTERNATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY
ASSESSMENT PROGRAM
In 1991, the Federal Aviation Administration started assessing
foreign countries to determine whether the countries met the
international standards established by the International Civil
4 Chicago Convention, supra note 2, art. 44, 61 Stat. at 1192-93, 15 U.N.T.S. at
326.
5 Id. art. 12, 61 Stat. at 1183, 15 U.N.T.S. at 304.
1 Id. arts. 37, 38, 61 Stat. at 1190-91, 15 U.N.T.S. at 320-322.
7 Id. art. 33, 61 Stat. at 1189, 15 U.N.T.S. at 318.
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Aviation Organization.8 According to the FAA, these assess-
ments were performed in compliance with the Chicago Conven-
tion, which permits States to carry out routine inspections of
foreign carriers in relation to the aircraft markings, airworthi-
ness and registration certificates, and crewmember certificates.9
In performing the routine inspections of foreign carriers, the
FAA found several cases of safety deficiencies, which prompted
the FAA to investigate the oversight capabilities of foreign coun-
tries. The FAA used new foreign carrier applications as the basis
for visiting foreign governments and conducting these
assessments. 10
In August 1992, the FAA established the International Avia-
tion Safety Assessment (IASA) Program." This Program investi-
gates and determines a country's ability to adhere to the
international Standards and Recommended Practices for air-
craft operations and maintenance established by the ICAO. The
TASA Program does not focus on whether an individual foreign
carrier is safe or unsafe. Instead, the Program determines
whether the country has a Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) in
place and the extent to which that authority ensures its air carri-
ers maintain operational and safety procedures.
According to the FAA, the purpose of the LASA program is to
"ensure that all foreign air carriers that operate to or from the
United States are properly licensed and with safety oversight
provided by a competent Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) in ac-
cordance with ICAO standards."' 2 Even though the focus of the
IASA is investigating the countries' - rather than their carriers'
- compliance with international safety standards, in practical
terms it is an assessment of foreign carriers, as it would be very
difficult to determine that a specific carrier is totally safe when
its flag country lacks oversight.
8 U.S. GAO, Aviation Safety: Increased Oversight of Foreign Carriers Needed, GAO/
RCED-93-42, Report to the Chairman, Subcomm. on Investigations & Oversight,
House Comm. on Public Works & Transp., Nov. 1992 [hereinafter U.S. GAO
Report].
9 Id. at 4.
10 Id. at 5-6.
11 FAA, Overview of the Federal Aviation Administration Flight Standards Ser-
vice International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) Program, available at http:/
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1. Factors Examined by the FAA
As defined by ICAO standards, the FAA examines several fac-
tors to determine whether a country has an adequate infrastruc-
ture for international aviation safety oversight.' The factors
are:
1. the existence of a law enabling the appropriate government
office to adopt regulations that are necessary to meet the min-
imum requirements established by ICAO;
2. current regulations that meet those requirements;
3. procedures to carry out what the regulations require;
4. air carrier certification, routine inspection, and surveillance
programs; and
5. organizational and personnel resources to implement and en-
force the above.
2. Deficiencies Found by the FAA
The FAA stated that its initial findings revealed two-thirds of
the countries with carriers operating to or from the United
States were not fully in compliance with ICAO standards.14 The
deficiencies found included:
1. inadequate and in some cases nonexistent regulatory
legislation;
2. lack of advisory documentation;
3. shortage of experienced airworthiness staff;
4. lack of control over important airworthiness related items,
such as issuance and enforcement of Airworthiness Direc-
tives, Minimum Equipment Lists, Investigation of Service Dif-
ficulty Reports, etc.;
5. lack of adequate technical data;
6. absence of Air Operator Certification (AOC) System;
7. nonconformance with the requirements of the AOC System;
8. lack or shortage of adequately trained flight operations in-
spectors including a lack of type ratings;
9. lack of updated company manuals for use by airmen;
10. inadequate proficiency check procedures; and
11. inadequately trained cabin attendants.
13 Press Release, FAA, FAA Announces Assessments of Foreign Compliance
with International Safety Standard (July 10, 1995) (on file with J. AIR. L. & COM.)
[hereinafter Foreign Compliance].




When the FAA originally created its safety audit program, the
agency established three categories of ratings for the countries'
compliance with ICAO safety standards: acceptable, conditional,
and unacceptable. 5
Category I (Acceptable) applies to a foreign civil aviation au-
thority that has been assessed by FAA inspectors and has been
found to license and oversee air carriers in accordance with
ICAO aviation safety standards.16
Category II (Conditional) applies to a foreign civil aviation
authority where FAA inspectors found areas that did not meet
ICAO aviation safety standards, and the FAA is negotiating ac-
tively with the authority to implement corrective measures.17
During these negotiations, the FAA permits the country's air-
lines to operate into the United States, and the FAA conducts
heightened surveillance of those flights.
Category III (Unacceptable) applies to a foreign civil aviation
authority found not to meet ICAO standards for aviation over-
sight. 8 Unacceptable ratings apply: if the country or civil avia-
tion authority has not developed or implemented laws or
regulations in accordance with ICAO standards; if it lacks the
technical expertise or resources to license or oversee civil avia-
tion; if it lacks the flight operations capability to certify, oversee,
and enforce air carrier operations requirements; if it lacks the
aircraft maintenance capability to certify, oversee, and enforce
air carrier maintenance requirements; or if it lacks appropriately
trained inspector personnel required by ICAO standards. Car-
rier operations to the United States from a country that has re-
ceived a Category III rating are not permitted unless the flights
are conducted by a carrier from a country meeting international
aviation safety standards.
It is important to consider that when the FAA first imple-
mented the IASA Program in 1992, the agency did so without
any notice to the countries being assessed.' 9 Nor did the FAA
conduct any advance rulemaking proceeding or otherwise pro-
vide notice to foreign countries of the FAA's planned program.
The FAA explained that its visits to and investigations of foreign




19 U.S. GAO Report, supra note 8.
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countries was to examine the applications of new carriers for
licenses to operate to and from the United States.
In the initial stage, the FAA did not make public the results of
its Safety Assessment Program, stating that "l[t] he success of this
program requires a great deal of cooperation and negotiation
between CAAs and FAA," and disclosure of those countries
found deficient "would frustrate the candor and cooperation
that are necessary to the success of this program and to the ne-
gotiations that often ensue about corrective measures that need
be taken. '' 20 However, several aviation consumer organizations,
including the International Airline Passengers Association
(LAPA), started asking the Department of Transportation for a
listing of foreign carriers that the Department found unsafe or
that did not comply with ICAO standards. These organizations
expressed their opinion that the results should be made public
in order to protect the safety of United States citizens as airline
passengers.2'
4. Public Disclosure of the Results
On September 2, 1994, the Department of Transportation re-
versed a three-year policy of silence and released the list of na-
tions whose flag carriers were prohibited from serving the
United States because of inadequate safety oversight by the
countries (i.e., Category III), as well as the list of nations which
were granted conditional approval (i.e., Category II).22 The
FAA had promised to keep the results confidential, but the De-
partment of Transportation decided to change to a public dis-
closure policy, so as to "allow the public to make informed travel
decisions by providing information regarding international avia-
tion safety standards and compliance. "23
According to the FAA, the majority of the countries that did
not meet international safety oversight standards were from
Latin America. Of thirty countries investigated, six out of the
nine nations found not to meet international aviation safety
2 Passenger Group Seeks Disclosure of DOT Unsafe Airline List, AVIATION DAILY,
June 14, 1994, at 424.
21 See id.
22 See Lisa Burgess, DOT Lists Foreign Airlines Deemed Unsafe, J. COM., Sept. 6,
1994, at 2B.
23 Public Disclosure of the Results of Foreign Civil Aviation Authorities Assess-
ments, 14 C.F.R. pt. 129 (Sept. 8, 1994).
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standards and prohibited from operating to the United States
were from Latin America. 24
B. LATIN AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE IASA PROGRAM
Latin American airline representatives immediately expressed
their concern that the public announcement from the Depart-
ment of Transportation would have an adverse impact on some
of the region's carriers. 25 The representatives feared that the
public may perceive Latin American airlines as unsafe, even
though the FAA's Assessment Program focused its investigation
on country oversight and not on individual carriers'
performance.
Many Latin American nations and their respective airlines
also criticized the FAA Assessment Program. They believed the
FAA unfairly picked them for review, arguing that other coun-
tries, such as China and Russia, which reportedly had serious
problems complying with ICAO's international safety standards,
were treated in a better way because the United States consid-
ered them to be more important trading partners.26
Latin American airline interests also complained that the
United States was using questions of safety to secure competitive
advantages for its own carriers over foreign carriers. The Latin
American carriers pointed to remarks made by United States of-
ficials who, while maintaining that the FAA's assessments were
not an indication of whether an individual foreign carrier was
safe or unsafe, seemed to suggest that travelers should consider
traveling on United States flag carriers.27 In particular, the car-
riers focused on the statement given by former Secretary of
Transportation, Federico Pefia, while announcing the results of
the FAA assessments. In his remarks, Mr. Pefia said: "I would
like to emphasize that travel to these two groups of countries is
not necessarily unsafe. To fly to these destinations, travelers
should consider using US flag carriers and the carriers of other
countries that have adequate civil aviation safety oversight. 28
In response, members of the Association of Latin American
Airlines asserted that the FAA was discriminating against small
Latin American airlines. Henry Boulton, chief executive of
24 Burgess, supra note 22.
25 Latin Interests Want DOT to Clarify Oversight Issue, AVIATION DAILY, Sept. 20,
1994, at 463 [hereinafter Latin Interests].
26 Jane Levere, Sore Over Safety, AIRLINE Bus., Feb. 1996, at 52.
27 Latin Interests, supra note 25, at 464.
28 Id.
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Avensa of Venezuela and chairman of the Andean Association of
Airlines, claimed that while the FAA restricted Latin American
carriers from flying to the United States, on grounds of inade-
quate safety oversight, the United States carriers had increased
their dominance in the markets the Latin American carriers
served.29
Caribbean countries also raised objections to the FAA's role
in giving air safety oversight ratings to the region's civil aviation
authorities, arguing that the oversight program should have
been monitored and administered multilaterally by ICAO and
not unilaterally by the FAA. The Caribbean countries felt that
categorization was a function that should not be carried out uni-
laterally by any national administration, and that ICAO should
perform its independent inspections on a multilateral basis."
More criticism arose from the FAA's category system, espe-
cially from the establishment of Category II:
This latter term has not been clearly defined, and carriers from
the . .. countries in the "conditional" category clearly are con-
fronted with the most difficult situation of any of the airlines
whose countries have been assessed. They retain the operating
authority from the DOT and their safety authority from the FAA,
yet they have been identified as flying from a country where
safety oversight is less than fully adequate. Clearly, the "condi-
tional" category is a politically safe pigeonhole that allows the
FAA to question a country's safety oversight program while avoid-
ing the controversial step of stopping existing service by carriers
of that country. It is a questionable policy if there truly are safety
concerns, but it is a neat way to avoid facing the tough decision
to stop service.'
C. CHANGES TO THE LASA PROGRAM
In May 2000, the FAA announced that it would only use two
categories in its Safety Assessment Program: Category I for coun-
tries that are found to be in compliance with minimum interna-
tional standards for aviation safety, and Category II for countries
that are found not to be in compliance with such minimum in-
219 Latin Carriers Accuse FAA of 'Economically Motivated' Safety Censures, AVIATION
DAILY, Aug. 15, 1995, at 248.
-1 Canute James, Caribbean Nations Rip U.S. Air Safety Plan, Want Other Oversight,
J. COM., Dec. 8, 1997, at 14A.
31 Robert D. Papkin, Some Observations on the US Government Policy Regarding For-
eign Aviation Oversight Programs.
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ternational standards . 2 The FAA explained that the change was
made "to eliminate any confusion that has resulted from having
two different categories regarding non-compliance with ICAO
standards. The FAA further stated that:
We believe that there has been a misimpression created that be-
ing in Category II reflects a higher degree of compliance with
ICAO standards than being in Category III. To correct this mis-
impression and make clear that no inferences should be drawn
about relative degrees of ICAO compliance, we are deleting Cate-
gory III and redefining Category II."
1. Redefinition of the Categories
A country's civil aviation authority is assessed as Category I
when it licenses and oversees air carriers in accordance with
ICAO aviation safety standards.34 The FAA assesses a country's
civil aviation authority as Category II when it determines that
the country does not provide safety oversight of its air carrier
operators in accordance with the minimum safety oversight stan-
dards established by the ICAO. 5 This rating is applied if one or
more of the following deficiencies are found:
1. The country lacks laws or regulations necessary to support the
certification and oversight of air carriers in accordance with
minimum international standards.
2. The country's CAA lacks the technical expertise, resources,
and organization to license or oversee air carrier operations.
3. The CAA does not have adequately trained and qualified tech-
nical personnel.
4. The CAA does not provide adequate inspector guidance to
ensure enforcement of, and compliance with, minimum inter-
national standards.
5. The CAA has insufficient documentation and records of certi-
fication and inadequate continuing oversight and surveillance
of air carrier operations.
32 Changes to the International Aviation Safety Assessment (JASA) Program,
14 C.F.R. pt. 129 (May 25, 2000).
33 Id.
34 The FAA Assessment Results Definition, at http://www.faa.gov/avr/iasa/
iasadef5.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2002).
35 Id.
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2. Category II Countries
Category II countries are divided into two groups, based on
whether they have air carrier operations within the United
States at the time of the assessment.
While in Category II status, carriers with existing operations
will be allowed to continue their operations at current levels
under heightened FAA surveillance. Expansion or changes in
services to the United States by these carriers are not permitted
while in Category II, although new services will be allowed if op-
erated using aircraft wet-leased from a duly authorized and
properly supervised U.S. carrier or a foreign air carrier from a
Category I country that is authorized to serve the United States
using its own aircraft."
Carriers without existing operations will not be allowed to
commence service to the United States while in Category II sta-
tus, although they may conduct services if operated using air-
craft wet-leased from a duly authorized and properly supervised
U.S. carrier or a foreign air carrier from a Category I country
that is authorized to serve the United States with its own
aircraft.
As of July 15, 2002, the results of the International Aviation
Safety Assessment Plan showed that out of the ninety-seven
countries investigated, seventy-one were classified in Category I
and twenty-six in Category 11.18 Out of these latter twenty-six,
thirteen did not have carriers operating into the United States at
the time of the assessment. 9
D. THE MODEL AVIATION REGULATORY DOCUMENT
The FAA developed the Model Aviation Regulatory Docu-
ment from the experience gained during the International Avia-
tion Safety Assessment Program. This document consists of sets
of aviation laws, regulations, and standards that may be used by
a State's civil aviation authority to review the country's present
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 FAA International Aviation Safety Assessment Program Results, at http://
www.faa.gov/avr/iasa/iasa48ws.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2002) [hereinafter FAA
IASA Program Results]; see infra Annex II.
39 FAA IASA Program Results, supra note 38. A recent change in the results of
the FAA's ASA Program was the downgrading of Panama's civil aviation author-
ity in May 2001 from Category I to Category 1I. This change will surely affect
Continental's code-share alliance with Copa Airlines. See Panama Audit Will Cost
Copa, Continental May Drop Code, AVIATION DAILY, May 16, 2001, at 3.
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laws and regulations, in order to formulate or modify the coun-
try's system of laws and regulations to meet the standards estab-
lished by the ICAO." The Document covers all areas of civil
aviation laws, including safety, air traffic control, aircraft certifi-
cation, security, airports, accident investigation, safety oversight,
airworthiness, flight operations, maintenance, and flight crew
licensing.
1. Model Civil Aviation Safety Act
The Model Civil Aviation Safety Act sets out a legal basis for
the establishment of a Civil Aviation Authority in a contracting
State. The Act's purpose is to provide the basis for review and
modification of the existing civil aviation law of a State, where
the States considers such review and modification necessary in
order to comply with its international obligations. 4'
The Model Civil Aviation Safety Act establishes the Civil Avia-
tion Authority under the Director of Civil Aviation, and defines
both the duties and the authority granted to the Director under
the law of the contracting State. The various subchapters ad-
dress: the organization, administration, general powers, and du-
ties of the Authority; the registration of aircraft in the
contracting State and the requirement to maintain a registry sys-
tem; the statutory bases for safety regulation by the Authority,
including the certification of aviation personnel and entities,
the duties required of aviation operators and airmen, the power
of inspection granted to the Authority, and the prohibitions ap-
plicable to all citizens of the contracting State in matters related
to aviation; the civil and criminal penalties that may be imposed
by the Authority for violations of the law or the regulations; and
the procedure to be followed by the Authority in an enforce-
ment action."2
2. Model Regulations
The ICAO Model Regulations provide the regulatory require-
ments for aircraft that operate internationally from and into the
contracting State. The Regulations attempt to address the situa-
40 See FAA, Model Civil Aviation Safety Act and Model Regulations, at http://
www.faa.gov/avr/iasa/INTRO.doc (last visited Sept. 16, 2002).
41 Id.
42 Civil Aviation Safety Act, available at http://www.faa.gov/avr/iasa/calr.htm
(last visited Sept. 16, 2002).
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tion faced by those countries that have aircraft operating both
within the country and in international aviation.43
The Model Regulations cover areas such as:
1. the basic rules of construction and application of the regula-
tions and those governing the administration of licenses and
certifications;
2. the requirements for the licensing and certification of air-
men, pilots, and non-pilot flight crewmembers, such as
mechanics;
3. the certification and administration of Aviation Training Or-
ganizations (ATO) for the training and qualification of
airmen;
4. the requirements for registration of aircraft and the applica-
tion of nationality and registration marks;
5. the regulatory requirements for the airworthiness of aircraft;
the registration and monitoring of Approved Maintenance
Organizations (AMO);
6. the minimum regulatory requirements for instruments and
equipment on aircrafts;
7. the regulatory requirements for the operation of aircraft
when those operations are executed outside of the con-
tracting State by its pilots and operators, unless compliance
would result in a violation of the laws of the foreign State in
which the operation is conducted;
8. the requirements for persons or entities to be granted an
AOC certification;
9. the requirements applicable to foreign air carriers; and
10. the requirements for aerial work operations.44
The Model Regulations include Implementing Standards,
which provide detailed requirements that sustain the intent of
the regulations presented, but gain the force and effect of the
governing regulations only if specifically referred to in the gov-
erning regulation.4 5 The Implementing Standards were estab-
lished in order to permit a Civil Aviation Authority the flexibility
to include new practices or procedures as they become availa-
ble, without the procedures necessary to promulgate legally
binding regulations.





IV. INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
A. THE SAFETY OVERSIGHT PROGRAMME
The complaints in response to the FAA's Assessment Program
evolved into arguments that an international body like the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization should assume the safety
oversight assessment function. The ICAO was itself concerned
about the unilateral nature of the action taken by the FAA. For-
mer ICAO Secretary General, Phillipe Rochat, expressed the
view that safety oversight was a global problem, not a regional or
sub-regional problem.46 ICAO began seriously to consider the
creation of a mechanism to inspect and supervise nations on the
safety oversight of their air carriers.
In 1994, ICAO's Council approved the idea of establishing a
Safety Oversight Programme (SOP) that would investigate the
level of compliance of the member nations vis-A.-vis the require-
ments of the Chicago Convention and its Annexes.4 7 Under the
program, ICAO would send teams of experts to member coun-
tries to examine that nation's air safety laws and regulations, as
well as the methods used for certifying and supervising air carri-
ers. The teams would also review the county's organizations in-
volved in the control and supervision of flight operations,
maintenance, and training programs, as well as the manage-
ment and use of air carriers and airworthiness inspectors.48 The
Safety Oversight Programme would help member States enforce
carrier compliance with ICAO safety standards, mainly by con-
ducting audits to identify the deficiencies and offer assistance in
correcting them.
Under ICAO's Safety Oversight Programme, safety assess-
ments would only be carried out at the petition of a member
nation, and both the initial and final reports on how and
whether that country meets ICAO's safety standards would re-
main confidential (presumably to protect member states' sover-
eignty). ICAO would follow the same voluntary procedure in
sending a team to review the safety and security of aviation prac-
tices in a member nation. The final report would specify any
area in which the country is not in compliance with ICAO's
Standards and Recommended Practices. The member nation
46 ICAO Moving to Address Compliance Concern, AVIATION DAILY, Nov. 1, 1994, at
174.
47 See Chicago Convention, supra note 2.
48 David Hughes, U.S., Europe Back ICAO Safety Oversight Program, AvIATION WK.
& SPACE TECH., Oct. 30, 1995, at 47.
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could then decide whether to take actions to remedy the prob-
lem with ICAO's assistance.49 This program was initially viewed
by various U.S. authorities as weak because of its lack of re-
sources, its reliance on voluntary assessments by member na-
tions, and the non-disclosure of the results.50
At ICAO's February 1997 session in Montreal, ICAO's highly
regarded Council President, Dr. Assad Kotaite, publicly declared
that ICAO must be given more power to audit its member States
routinely for safety and security.5 1 Dr. Kotaite expressed the
view that "to help raise levels of security throughout the world,
the International Civil Aviation Organization needs greater au-
thority to determine whether nations are in compliance" with
the Chicago Convention and its Annexes.5" He also argued that
"ICAO as an international body should be empowered to closely
check the implementation of safety and security standards and
to carry out regular inspections."53
B. THE STRATEGIC ACTION PLAN: A GLOBAL STRATEGY FOR
SAFETY OVERSIGHT
Nations such as the United States and United Kingdom con-
tinued to press ICAO to monitor safety and security standards of
member nations more actively, and in May 1997, ICAO
launched its first comprehensive re-evaluation since its creation,
with the objective of increasing flight safety and security.54 Dr.
Kotaite renewed his earlier proposal for increased powers to
oversee the implementation of safety and security standards. He
suggested a further step for ICAO: the expansion of its role to
include implementation as well as development of standards
and procedures. Dr. Kotaite stated that:
ICAO is already the accepted authority for the development of
civil aviation security and safety standards... Our goal should
now be to become the recognized worldwide auditor of safety
and security standards for international civil aviation. Safety and
security audits would not infringe on the sovereignty of States but
49 Id.
5'0 Doug Cameron, Safer Than Ever? Safety Oversight Regulation, AIRLINE Bus.,
Oct. 1, 1997, at 62.
51 Kotaite Call for Tougher ICAO Role on Safety, Security Issues, AVIATION DAILY,
Feb. 27, 1997, at 346.
52 Jd
53 hd.
54 ICAO Boosts Safety Oversight, Renews Call for More Power, AVIATION DAILY, May
27, 1997, at 340.
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should rather be seen as enhancing cooperation through ICAO,
the recognized body to which states belong.55
In this sense, ICAO would have the authority to carry out
technical inspections in any State to check closely on that State's
implementation of the safety and security standards established
by the Organization.56
ICAO's so-called Strategic Action Plan was first adopted by the
ICAO Council on February 7, 1997, and updated on June 12,
2000. 57 The objectives of this Plan are:
to further the safety, security and efficiency of international civil
aviation and promote the principles enshrined in the Conven-
tion on International Civil Aviation by developing the vision for
harmonious development of international civil aviation on a na-
tional and regional basis and reflecting this vision in global plan-
ning, by creating and fostering the implementation of common
aviation standards and practices, and by encouraging the eco-
nomic design and operation of aircraft and aviation facilities
while avoiding discrimination between contracting States and op-
timizing the utilization of human, technical and financial
resources.
58
In order to fulfill the objectives of its Strategic Action Plan,
ICAO decided to carry out the following actions:59
1. Promote the implementation of ICAO Standards and Recom-
mended Practices to the greatest extent possible worldwide.
2. Develop and adopt new or amended Standards and Recom-
mended Practices and associated documents in a timely man-
ner to meet changing needs.
3. Strengthen the legal framework governing international civil
aviation by the development of new international air law in-
struments as required, and by encouraging the ratification by
States of the existing instruments.
4. Ensure the currency, coordination, and implementation of re-
gional air navigation plans, and establish the framework for
the efficient implementation of new air navigation systems.
5. Respond on a timely basis to major challenges to the safe, se-
cure and efficient development and operation of civil
aviation.
55 Id.
56 SeeJames Ott, ICAO Stresses Safety Compliance, AVixi'iON WK. & SPACE TECH.,
June 2, 1997, at 35.
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6. Ensure that guidance and information on the economic regu-
lation of international air transport is current and effective.
7. Assist in the mobilization of human, technical and financial
resources for civil aviation facilities and services.
8. Ensure the greatest possible efficiency and effectiveness in the
operations of the Organization, in order to meet the above
objectives.
Under the Strategic Action Plan, ICAO audits would not be
carried out in those countries that have demonstrated that they
have their own effective audit mechanisms in place. For other
countries, the emphasis would be on voluntary participation,
though obligatory audits could be imposed. In cases where sig-
nificant safety or security shortcomings are identified and re-
main for a specified period of time after the audit, effective
measures to guarantee aviation safety and security through an
appropriate mechanism would not be ruled out.60
In November 1997, ICAO held a conference devoted exclu-
sively to aviation safety and the formulation of a global strategy
for safety oversight.6' The conference focused on ICAO's over-
sight responsibilities and the organizational and financial impli-
cations of expanding them, including the concepts of safety
oversight audits of sovereign nations.6 2 Delegates approved an
expanded base for inspections that would include all ICAO An-
nexes related to safety, adding those dealing with air traffic ser-
vices, airports, support systems, and facilities. Member States
also agreed on the increase of reporting and monitoring re-
quirements that would disclose the level of the nation's obser-
vance of ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices.
Member States would have a reasonable time to remedy
problems identified by oversight officials without strict
timetables.6"
The ICAO World Conference made five major recommenda-
tions." First, the ICAO should carry out regular, mandatory,
systematic, and harmonized safety audits on all Contracting
60 Launch of the Strategic Action Plan, Address by the President of the Coun-
cil of ICAO (May 22, 1997), at http://www.icao.org/cgi/goto.pl?icao/en/
strategy.htm.
61 ICAO World Conference Recommends Significant Improvements to Safety
Oversight Programme and Strategy (Nov. 13, 1997), at http://www.icao.int/
icao/en/nr/pio9722.htm [hereinafter ICAO World Conference].
62 James Ott, Aviation Authorities Endorse ICAO's New Safety Drive, AVtATION WK.
& SPACE TECH., Nov. 17, 1997 at 41.
63 Id.
64 ICAO World Conference, supra note 61.
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States. Second, the ICAO should implement greater trans-
parency and increased disclosure, and that assessed States
should have reasonable time to remedy deficiencies before such
information would be disclosed. Third, the ICAO Safety Over-
sight Programme should be expanded, at the appropriate time,
to all areas of civil aviation that have an impact on safety. Those
expansions should initially include air services, aerodromes, and
support facilities and services. Fourth, countries or regions
should coordinate their safety oversight activities with the ICAO
Safety Oversight Programme. Fifth, the ICAO should en-
courage donors and funding organizations to cooperate in mak-
ing use of the technical cooperation services of the ICAO for
implementing their program of assistance to civil aviation.
C. THE UNIVERSAL SAFETY OVERSIGHT AUDIT PROGRAMME
The Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP)
was established during ICAO's 32nd Assembly in 1998. This
Programme features mandatory, systematic, and harmonized
safety audits, to be carried out on a regular basis by ICAO in all
member States, beginning January 1, 19 9 9 .65 USOAP super-
seded the voluntary ICAO Safety Oversight Programme.66
The Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme assists each
contracting State in the implementation of the ICAO's Stan-
dards and Recommended Practices, as well as relevant associ-
ated procedures, guidance material, and safety-related
practices.67 The Programme also provides for action plans to
address identified deficiencies, to direct assistance, and when re-
quired, to carry out corrective measures.6
Under the Audit Programme, the findings of the audits will
be disseminated to Other States, but only for safety-related pur-
poses. 69 This approach was taken to address the complaints that
arose from the non-disclosure policy under the previous Safety
Oversight Programme. Initially, the Programme was limited to
legislation, procedures, and practices as they relate to personnel
65 See ICA 0 Calls 1998 Landmark Yearfor Global Cooperation in Aviation, AVIATION
DAILY, Jan. 11, 1999, at 51.
66 Compare ICAO World Conference, supra note 61, with ICAO, Implementing
SARP's - The Key to Aviation Safety and Efficiency (Dec. 6, 2000), at http://
www.icao.int/icao/en/nr/pio2000l2.htm [hereinafter Implementing SARP's].
67 Implementing SARP's, supra note 66.
6 Id.
69 ICAO Assembly Turns Spotlight on Safety, at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/
jr/5309_arl.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2002).
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licensing and the operation and airworthiness of aircraft.71' The
33rd Session of the ICAO Assembly expanded the Programme
to cover air traffic services, aerodromes, and aircraft accident
and incident investigation.7 '
At the 160th session of the ICAO Council, in May 2000, the
Secretary General presented the progress of the Universal Safety
Oversight Audit Programme. Seventy-three States were audited
since the beginning of audit activities in March 1999. Fourteen
States had requested deferral (i.e., a request by a State to defer
an audit, generally citing as reason for deferral that such State is
in the process of drafting new civil aviation laws).72 According
to the Secretary General's report, the audits revealed that the
identified problems were widespread and not limited to any par-
ticular region. The report establishes that the general economic
health of a particular State seems to have an impact on the level
of government commitment towards civil aviation safety over-
sight activities. The recurrent problems found in developing
states were the unavailability of a regulatory framework, an inad-
equate organization, and the lack of qualified and experienced
technical personnel. However, the report also determines that
the audits revealed that the civil aviation authorities of the con-
tracting States were eager to receive the audit report, which they
can, in turn, present to their governments in an effort to attract
more government support for a more effective, even if more ex-
pensive, safety oversight effort.
As for developed countries, the report states that there were
still a relatively high number of differences between State regu-
lations and ICAO Annex provisions, although the differences
have been lower than those experienced at the beginning of the
Programme. The report also notes that even though some devel-
oped States have agreed with the findings and recommenda-
tions of the ICAO audit teams, they have shown reluctance to
implement corrective action. The major reasons provided for
such reluctance were financial considerations, the belief that
they have a good safety record, and that investment to fine-tune
70 Implementing SARP's, supra note 66.
71 Resolutions Adopted at the 33rd Session of the Assembly, at http://
www.icao.int/icao/en/assembl/a33/resolutions-a33.pdf (last visited Sept. 16,
2002).
72 ICAO, Progress of the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme, ICAO
Council 160th Session, May 18, 2000.
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a working system would be hard to justify to their
Governments. 73
In his conclusion, ICAO's Secretary General concluded that
the Programme has continued to progress, that the contracting
States have been highly supportive of, and committed to it, and
that all contracting States will be audited by the end of this
year. 4
While the FAA has been highly supportive of ICAO's Pro-
gramme, they still plan to continue their own assessment pro-
gram. In a letter to the President of the Council of ICAO, the
FAA's Administrator, Ms. Jane Garvey, expressed the view that
FAA would like to rely on ICAO's audit findings, but in order to
do so, the reports must provide enough information that would
allow the FAA to make their own determinations, or the audited
State must release the report to the FAA. 75 Ms. Garvey also
stated that:
[T]he FAA's goal is to rely totally on information from ICAO in
making its determination. However, until we reach this goal, we
will continue to exercise our right to conduct our own in-country
assessments if warranted in specific situations. Such situations
could arise if we receive conflicting information from other relia-
ble sources or if the ICAO audit information does not fully meet
our requirements. Moreover, even with total reliance on ICAO's
information, the FAA must - in accordance with its congressional
mandate - continue to make determinations regarding the safety
oversight capabilities of States whose carriers operate to the
United States, and to disclose its findings to the public, which is
completely consistent with our rights and obligations under the
Chicago Convention."
In response to the FAA's policy of continuing their own assess-
ments program, ICAO's position has been to support the objec-
tive of phasing out duplicative programs, particularly in the field
of safety audits. ICAO believes this will ultimately lead to a single
worldwide and neutral safety oversight audit program.7
In the meantime, it is important to consider what would hap-
pen if the results of ICAO's Audit Programme determine that an
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Letter from Jane Garvey, Administrator, FAA, to Assad Kotaite, President of
the Council, ICAO (Sept. 14, 2000) (on file with author).
76 Id.
77 Letter from Assad Kotaite, President of the Council, ICAO, to Jane Garvey,
Administrator, FAA (Oct. 6, 2000) (on file with author).
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assessed country is in compliance with the minimum standards
established in the Chicago Convention and its Annexes, but the
FAA does not agree with the conclusion of the assessment. Since
the Chicago Convention establishes ICAO's authority to create
the minimum safety standards for international air navigation,
and each contracting State undertakes to collaborate in assuring
the highest degree of uniformity in such standards, the United
States, as a signatory to the Chicago Convention, would more
than likely have to accept ICAO's conclusion that a country
complies with the minimum safety standards, even if the FAA
considers that such country may not be fully in compliance with
the standards.
An equally important problem is whether ICAO will agree to
make its audit findings public even over the objection of a coun-
try that may have failed the audit. To the extent full disclosure
prevails, the FAA's willingness to accept ICAO's conclusions
should be greater.
V. CENTRAL AMERICAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY
Latin American airlines have confronted strong pressures to
assure the flying public of the safety of their operations since the
DOT declared that many Latin American countries did not
meet ICAO's standards for overseeing the safe operation of
their carriers.7 The effects of the FAA inspections and the pros-
pect of additional scrutiny by both the FAA and ICAO are forc-
ing Latin American civil aviation authorities to consider uniting
in regional alliances to pool and improve their safety oversight
capacity:
A joint effort would allow these countries to take into their own
hands, and to defend on a combined basis if necessary, the estab-
lishment of a proper framework for aviation operations and
safety oversight rather than have the FAA dictate the level and
quality of safety standards. Such a cooperative effort would not
only eliminate a festering sore in aviation relations between the
United States and a number of Caribbean and Latin American
countries, but would also permit those countries to work to-
gether on a specific project that would help create the working
71 SeeJorge Vargas, Presentation at the Fifth GAIN World Conference (Dec. 5-
6, 2001), at http://204.108.6.23/Conferences/GAIN5/briefings/Vargas.pdf.
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relationship and trust essential to other acts of mutual aviation
interest.7 9
One of Latin America's most important initiatives in the safety
oversight area is the creation of the Central American Aviation
Safety Agency (ACSA). ACSA was created on December 15,
1999, as a dependency of the Central American Air Navigation
Services Corporation (COCESNA). The Council of Central
American Ministers of Transportation ratified the creation and
operation of ACSA on May 12, 2000. ACSA was formally inaugu-
rated on September 1, 2000, and its official domicile is Costa
Rica, although offices may be established in any other member
country.
The initiative to create ACSA developed at the end of 1998.
ACSA was prompted by both the need of the Central American
countries to have a regional entity in charge of safety navigation
matters, and the expressed intention of these countries to im-
prove the region's safety oversight capabilities. ACSA was also
created in response to the problem faced by many small States,
such as the Central American countries, whose financial reality
does not permit them to establish an individual agency for each
nation.
The FAA's Assessment Program had rated the majority of
COCESNA's member States as Category II, which means that
their air carriers without existing operations to the United States
are not allowed to commence operations, except by wet-lease
arrangements with U.S. or other qualified foreign carriers. As of
January 18, 2001, only one country (Costa Rica) out of the six
member states (Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Gua-
temala and Nicaragua) was rated as Category 1.80
The main function of this regional entity is to provide aviation
safety oversight for the Central American region. It recom-
mends and advises the member States of the Central American
Air Navigation Services Corporation on the fulfillment of their
obligations under the Convention on International Civil Avia-
tion and its Annexes. The Agency is also authorized to perform
periodic re-evaluations of the standards for certification of each
member's compliance with the international safety standards, as
well as to carry out periodic inspections in those countries, in
79 Robert D. Papkin, Some Perspectives on Future Aviation Relations Between the US,
Latin America and the Caribbean, Remarks at the First International Airline CEO
Conference (Aug. 23, 1993).
80 Burgess, supra note 22.
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order to guarantee the continuing validity of the fulfillment of
their obligations.
On February 25, 2000, COCESNA's Council approved the By-
laws of the Central American Aviation Safety Agency, which gov-
ern ACSA's administrative and technical activities. They estab-
lish the rules, procedures and regulations for the uniformity of
the aviation safety oversight with which all member countries of
COCESNA must comply, in accordance with their international
obligations.8 '
The Central American Aviation Safety Agency recommends
and advises the Central American civil aviation authorities in the
following matters:8 2
1. Procedures for the certification of:
a. local operators of air transportation
b. maintenance stations
c. instruction and training centers
d. air navigation
e. services for technical assistance in navigation
2. The preparation or review of the aviation regulations of the
member countries, in order to make them uniform.
3. The development of the National Registry of Aircraft.
4. The establishment of the Air Operator Manual of the Air Nav-
igation Inspector Manual.
5. The establishment and/or development of the Surveillance
Program
6. The establishment of the Operations, Navigation and Licenses
Departments.
7. Evaluation of contracts for lease or freight of aircraft, as well
as any other contract related to commercial air transportation.
In relation to the surveillance of Aviation Safety, the Agency is
authorized to perform periodic re-evaluations of the standards
for certification of each member's compliance with the interna-
tional safety standards, as well as to carry out periodic inspec-
tions in those countries, in order to guarantee the continuing
validity of the fulfillment of their obligations. The Agency is au-
thorized to perform the following activities:
1. inspecion of operating bases;
2. inspection of stations;
3. inspection of maintenance stations;
4. inspection of instruction and training centers;
5. ramp inspections;
81 By-laws of the Central American Aviation Safety Agency, art. 3 (2000).




7. supervision of check procedures;
8. simulator inspections;
9. inspection of new aircrafts;
10. evaluation of the amendments to the Operations Manual,
Maintenance Control Manual, Inspection Procedures Man-
ual, Minimum Equipment Lists, Safety Manual, and any
other manual or document required by Annex 6 of ICAO;
and
11. create and develop a database for air navigation information
in all member countries.
ACSA's activities are subject to the supervision of a Technical
Board, composed of all the Civil Aviation Authorities from the
member countries of COCESNA, and to the administrative su-
pervision of COCESNA's General Management." The Agency
has five departments: Flight Operations, Air Navigation, Air Nav-
igation Registry, Licenses for Air Navigation Personnel, and the
Central American Database Center.84
Although ACSA was only recently created, and has just started
assessing the Central American region safety oversight capacity,
it is a very important step towards a coordinated approach to
help enforce and improve safety oversight throughout the area
on a regional basis.
VI. CONCLUSION
Compliance with the standards and recommended practices
established by the Convention on International Civil Aviation is
a necessary and major concern for all ICAO contracting States.
The several programs developed by organizations such as the
Federal Aviation Administration, the International Civil Aviation
Organization, and the Central American Aviation Safety Agency
have focused on ensuring that all the contracting States to the
Chicago Convention comply with their international obligations
and fulfill the primary goal of the Convention: to further the
safety, security, and efficiency of international civil aviation by a
harmonious development of international civil aviation on a na-
tional and regional basis.
The FAA International Aviation Safety Assessment Program
can be criticized because its foundation is based on the unilat-
eral action of the FAA in inspecting and categorizing each coun-
83 See id. art. 7.
84 Id.
6752002]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
try's compliance with its international obligations, and also
because the factors used by the FAA in its assessments are based
on U.S. standards, not necessarily on those established by the
International Civil Aviation Organization. However, it must be
acknowledged that the FAA's Program has in fact prompted sev-
eral States to be much more conscious of their deficiencies in
implementing internationally recognized safety standards and
exercising adequate safety oversight.
The mandatory, systematic, and harmonized safety audits, car-
ried out on a regular basis by the International Civil Aviation
Organization in all member States, and established by the Uni-
versal Safety Oversight Audit Programme, are a necessary step in
assessing each country's compliance with the required mini-
mum standards, identifying deficiencies, and providing assis-
tance to carry out corrective measures. This Programme is in the
process of being recognized as the universal and neutral Safety
Oversight Audit Program. It could be expected that, once the
Programme is established and the results of ICAO audits are dis-
closed to all participating ICAO States, the FAA will retire from
conducting assessments of foreign countries, relying instead on
ICAO's role as the sole international authority for safety
oversight.
Coordination beyond national and regional borders is a fun-
damental move towards achieving a greater degree of uniform-
ity in regulations and standards, procedures and organization
regarding civil aviation matters. A coordinated approach is
needed in order to maintain and improve international safety
standards worldwide. In this sense, the establishment of re-
gional organizations to help enforce safety standards and over-
sight throughout a particular region of countries, by correlating
their civil aviation laws and regulations, is a major step towards
accomplishing a greater unity of international safety efforts.
This is especially true in the case of Latin American countries,
which in most cases have limited financial and human resources
to meet ICAO requirements. The establishment by ICAO of its
USOAP Program and the establishment by Central American
countries of their ACSA and COCESNA are important initiatives
in achieving those objectives.
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ANNEX I
CONTRACTING STATES TO THE CONVENTION
ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
(as of September 16, 2002)
Date of Deposit of an Instrument
Number Country of Ratification or Adherence (A)
1 Afghanistan April 4, 1947
2 Albania March 28, 1991 (A)
3 Algeria May 7, 1963 (A)
4 Andorra January 26, 2001 (A)
5 Angola March 11, 1977 (A)
6 Antigua and Barbuda November 10, 1981 (A)
7 Argentina June 4, 1946 (A)
8 Armenia June 18, 1992 (A)
9 Australia March 1, 1947
10 Austria August 27, 1948 (A)
11 Azerbaijan October 9,1992 (A)
12 Bahamas May 27, 1975 (A)
13 Bahrain August 20, 1971 (A)
14 Bangladesh December 22,1972 (A)
15 Barbados March 21, 1967 (A)
16 Belarus June 4, 1993 (A)
17 Belgium May 05, 1947
18 Belize December 7, 1990 (A)
19 Benin May 29, 1961 (A)
20 Bhutan May 17, 1989 (A)
21 Bolivia April 4, 1947
22 Bosnia and Herzegovina January 13, 1993 (A)
23 Botswana December 28, 1978 (A)
24 Brazil July 8, 1946
25 Brunei Darussalam December 4, 1984 (A)
26 Bulgaria June 8, 1967 (A)
27 Burkina Faso March 21, 1962 (A)
28 Burundi January 19, 1968 (A)
29 Cambodia January 16, 1956 (A)
30 Cameroon January 15, 1960 (A)
31 Canada February 13, 1946
32 Cape Verde August 19, 1976 (A)
33 Central African Republic June 28, 1961 (A)
34 Chad July 3, 1962 (A)
35 Chile March 11, 1947
36 China February 20, 1946
37 Colombia October 31, 1947
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Date of Deposit of an Instrument
Number Country of Ratification or Adherence (A)
38 Comoros January 15, 1985 (A)
39 Congo April 26, 1962 (A)
40 Cook Islands August 20, 1986 (A)
41 Costa Rica May 1, 1958
42 Cote d'Ivoire October 31, 1960 (A)
43 Croatia April 9, 1992 (A)
44 Cuba May 11, 1949
45 Cyprus January 17, 1961 (A)
46 Czech Republic March 4, 1993 (A)
47 Democratic People's Republic of Korea August 16, 1977 (A)
48 Democratic Republic of the Congo July 27, 1961 (A)
49 Denmark February 28, 1947
50 Djibouti June 30, 1978 (A)
51 Dominican Republic January 25, 1946
52 Ecuador August 20, 1954
53 Egypt March 13, 1947
54 El Salvador June 11, 1947
55 Ecuatorial Guinea February 22, 1972 (A)
56 Eritrea September 17, 1993 (A)
57 Estonia January 24, 1992 (A)
58 Ethiopia March 1, 1947
59 Fiji March 5, 1973 (A)
60 Finland March 30, 1949 (A)
61 France March 25, 1947
62 Gabon January 18, 1962 (A)
63 Gambia May 13, 1977 (A)
64 Georgia January 21, 1994 (A)
65 Germany May 9, 1956 (A)
66 Ghana May 9, 1957 (A)
67 Greece March 13, 1947
68 Grenada August 31, 1981 (A)
69 Guatemala April 28, 1947
70 Guinea March 27, 1959 (A)
71 Guinea-Bissau December 15, 1977 (A)
72 Guyana February 3, 1967 (A)
73 Haiti March 25, 1948
74 Honduras May 7, 1953
75 Hungary September 30, 1969 (A)
76 Iceland March 21, 1947
77 India March 1, 1947
78 Indonesia April 27, 1950 (A)
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79 Iran, Islamic Republic April 19, 1950
80 Iraq June 2, 1947
81 Ireland October 31, 1946
82 Israel May 24, 1949 (A)
83 Italy October 31, 1947 (A)
84 Jamaica March 26, 1963 (A)
85 Japan September 8, 1953 (A)
86 Jordan March 18, 1947 (A)
87 Kazakhstan August 21, 1992 (A)
88 Kenya May 1, 1964 (A)
89 Kiribati April 14, 1981 (A)
90 Kuwait May 18, 1968 (A)
91 Kyrgyzstan February 25, 1993 (A)
92 Lao People's Democratic Republic June 13, 1955 (A)
93 Latvia July 13, 1992 (A)
94 Lebanon September 19, 1949
95 Lesotho May 19, 1975 (A)
96 Liberia February 11, 1947
97 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya January 29, 1953 (A)
98 Lithuania January 8, 1992 (A)
99 Luxembourg April 28, 1948
100 Madagascar April 14, 1962 (A)
101 Malawi September 11, 1964 (A)
102 Malaysia April 7, 1958 (A)
103 Maldives March 12, 1974 (A)
104 Mali November 8, 1960 (A)
105 Malta January 5, 1965 (A)
106 Marshall Islands March 18, 1988 (A)
107 Mauritania January 13, 1962 (A)
108 Mauritius January 30, 1970 (A)
109 Mexico June 25, 1946
110 Micronesia, Federated States September 27, 1988 (A)
111 Monaco January 4, 1980 (A)
112 Mongolia September 7, 1989 (A)
113 Morocco November 13, 1956 (A)
114 Mozambique January 5, 1977 (A)
115 Myanmar July 8, 1948 (A)
116 Namibia April 30, 1991 (A)
117 Nauru August 25, 1975 (A)
118 Nepal June 29, 1960 (A)
119 Netherlands March 26, 1947
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Number Country of Ratification or Adherence (A)
120 New Zealand March 7, 1947
121 Nicaragua December 28, 1945
122 Niger May 29, 1961 (A)
123 Nigeria November 14, 1960 (A)
124 Norway May 5, 1947
125 Oman January 24, 1973 (A)
126 Pakistan November 6, 1947 (A)
127 Palau October 4, 1995 (A)
128 Panama January 18, 1960 (A)
129 Papua New Guinea December 15, 1975 (A)
130 Paraguay January 21, 1946
131 Peru April 8, 1946
132 Philippines March 1, 1947
133 Poland April 6, 1945
134 Portugal February 27, 1947
135 Qatar September 5, 1971 (A)
136 Republic of Korea November 11, 1952 (A)
137 Republic of Moldova June 1, 1992 (A)
138 Romania April 30, 1965 (A)
139 Russian Federation October 15, 1970 (A)
140 Rwanda February 3, 1964 (A)
141 Saint Kitts and Nevis May 21, 2002"(A)
142 Saint Lucia November 20, 1979 (A)
143 Saint Vicent and the Grenadines November 15, 1983 (A)
144 Samoa November 21, 1996 (A)
145 San Marino May 13, 1988 (A)
146 Sao Tome and Principe February 28, 1977 (A)
147 Saudi Arabia February 19, 1962 (A)
148 Senegal November 11, 1960 (A)
149 Seychelles April 25, 1977 (A)
150 Sierra Leone November 22, 1961 (A)
151 Singapore May 20, 1966 (A)
152 Slovakia March 15, 1993 (A)
153 Slovenia May 13, 1992 (A)
154 Solomon Islands April 11, 1985 (A)
155 Somalia March 2, 1964 (A)
156 South Africa March 1, 1947
157 Spain March 5, 1947
158 Sri Lanka June 1, 1948 (A)
159 Sudan June 29, 1956 (A)
160 Suriname March 5, 1976 (A)
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161 Swaziland February 14, 1973 (A)
162 Sweden November 7, 1946
163 Switzerland February 6, 1947
164 Syrian Arab Republic December 21, 1949
165 Tajikistan September 3, 1993 (A)
166 Thailand April 4, 1947
167 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia December 10, 1992 (A)
168 Togo May 18, 1965 (A)
169 Tonga November 2, 1984 (A)
170 Trinidad and Tobago March 14, 1963 (A)
171 Tunisia November 18, 1957 (A)
172 Turkey December 20, 1945
173 Turkmenistan March 15, 1993 (A)
174 Uganda April 10, 1967 (A)
175 Ukraine August 10, 1992 (A)
176 United Arab Emirates April 25, 1972 (A)
177 United Kingdom March 1, 1947
178 United Republic of Tanzania April 23, 1962 (A)
179 United States August 9, 1946
180 Uruguay January 14, 1954
181 Uzbekistan October 13, 1992 (A)
182 Vanuatu August 17, 1983 (A)
183 Venezuela April 1, 1947 (A)
184 Vietnam March 13, 1980 (A)
185 Yemen April 17, 1964 (A)
186 Yugoslavia (F. R. of) December 14, 2000 (A)
187 Zambia October 30, 1964 (A)
188 Zimbabwe February 11, 1981 (A)
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ANNEX II
RESULTS OF THE FAA'S INTERNATIONAL
AVIATION ASSESSMENT PROGRAM
(as of July 15, 2002)
Number Country Category Number Country Category
1 Argentina 1 50 Jordan I
2 Aruba 1 51 Kiribati 2*
3 Australia 1 52 Kuwait 1
4 Austria 1 53 Luxembourg 1
5 Bahamas 2 54 Marshall Islands 1
6 Bangladesh 2 55 Malta 1
7 Belgium 1 56 Malaysia 1
8 Belize 2* 57 Mexico I
9 Bermuda 1 58 Morocco I
10 Bolivia 2 59 Nauru 2
11 Brazil 1 60 Netherlands I




13 Bulgaria 1 62 New Zealand 1
14 Canada 1 63 Nicaragua 2*
15 Cayman Islands 1 64 Norway 1
16 Chile 1 65 Oman 1









18 Colombia 1 67 Pakistan 1
19 Costa Rica 1 68 Panama 2
20 Cote D'lvoire 2 69 Paraguay 2*
21 Czech Republic 1 70 Peru 1
22 Denmark 1 71 Philippines 1
23 Dominican Republic 2* 72 Poland 1
24 Ecuador 2 73 Portugal 1
25 Egypt 1 74 Romania 1
26 El Salvador 2 75 Russia 1
27 Ethiopia 1 76 Saudi Arabia 1
28 Finland 1 77 Singapore I
29 France 1 78 South Africa I
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Number Country Category Number Country Category
30 Fiji 1 79 South Korea, 1
Republic of
31 Federal Republic of 1 80 Spain I
Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro)
32 Gambia 2* 81 Suriname 2*
33 Germany 1 82 Swaziland 2*
34 Ghana 1 83 Sweden 1
35 Greece 2 84 Switzerland 1
36 Guatemala 2 85 Taiwan I
37 Guyana 1 86 Thailand 1
38 Haiti 2* 87 Trinidad & Tobago 1
39 Honduras 2* 88 Turkey 1
40 Hong Kong 1 89 Turks & Caicos 2
41 Hungary 1 90 Ukraine 1
42 Iceland 1 91 United Kingdom 1
43 Ireland 1 92 Uruguay 2*
44 India 1 93 Uzbekistan I
45 Indonesia 1 94 Venezuela 2
46 Israel 1 95 Western Samoa I
47 Italy 1 96 Zaire 2*
48 Jamaica 1 97 Zimbabwe 2*
49 Japan I
Note: * countries whose carriers did not serve the US at the time of the assessment
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